The understanding of ideas as the only immediate objects of awareness arises in a number of texts. Complicating an understanding of such passages is that Descartes scholarship is divided on whether to attribute to him some version of an indirect theory of perception, or instead some version of a direct theory.
On both accounts, ideas mediate our perception of external objects. On direct theory accounts, the mediating role is only a process role. More generally, Descartes seems to view all ideas as mental pictures, of a sort.
Indirect perception interpretations have figured prominently in the history of Descartes scholarship. A number of recent commentators, however, have challenged this traditional view. Suppose that the present contents of my mind include a confused array of ideas — say, a confused assemblage of auditory ideas, or color ideas, or perhaps I am presently flooded with a confused assortment of ideas of emotion.
In such cases, the proper use of my faculties requires me to withhold judgment about the present state of my mind. It is surprising, therefore, to learn that on the standard view among scholars, Descartes holds a strong view of privileged access guaranteeing the truth of all introspective judgments about the present contents of our own minds. On the standard view, Descartes holds an infallibility thesis whereby judgments about our own mental states cannot be mistaken, if based on introspective awareness: if I seem to be in mental state x , then I am in x.
There is some variation in the way these doctrines are formulated in the literature. At least two lines of argument are widely cited in support of this standard interpretation. One draws on the transparency doctrine. The other draws on texts claimed to provide support. Zeno Vendler explains:. Those who question the interpretation are apt to note that from the fact that I have awareness of whatever is occurring in my mind, it does not follow that I have distinct awareness.
But in that case, forming a judgment about the present state of my mind is a recipe for error — i. Because simpler ideas are generally easier to render clear and distinct, it can perhaps seem that I enjoy introspective infallibility concerning them.
But suppose that while looking at multicolored sunset, I form an introspective judgment about precisely which color ideas are occurring in my mind. Must Descartes say that such judgments are infallible? Were Descartes committed to introspective infallibility, then he should say that we could never be mistaken as to whether our occurring ideas are ideas of sensation , or instead ideas of imagination occurring in a dream.
What about the textual line of argument regularly cited in support of the standard interpretation? Consider two Meditations passages that can seem to entail the infallibility thesis. I certainly seem to see, to hear, and to be warmed. Now as far as ideas are concerned, provided they are considered solely in themselves and I do not refer them to anything else, they cannot strictly speaking be false; for whether it is a goat or a chimera that I am imagining, it is just as true that I imagine the former as the latter.
As for the will and the emotions, here too one need not worry about falsity; for even if the things which I may desire are wicked or even non-existent, that does not make it any less true that I desire them.
Prima facie, it is plausible to take such passages to entail that if if I seem to be having an idea of blue, or an idea of a noise, or of warmth, etc. Read in this way, these passages anticipate the Fourth Meditation theory of judgment:. We have seen that, for Descartes, the only superlative perceptual state is that of clarity and distinctness. The only guarantee of truth in our introspective judgments is, like all other judgments, when they are based on clear and distinct perception: if I clearly and distinctly perceive myself to be in mental state x , then I am in x.
All quoted texts are from CSM. Newman utah. Conception of Knowledge 1. The Methods: Foundationalism and Doubt 2. First Meditation Doubting Arguments 3. The Cogito and Doubt 4. Perfect Knowledge, Circularity, and Truth 6. Proving an External Material World 7. Perfect Knowledge of Being Awake 9. Self-Knowledge 9. While distinguishing lesser grades of conviction, and perfect knowledge,he writes: I distinguish the two as follows: there is conviction [ persuasio ] when there remains some reason which might lead us to doubt, but knowledge [ scientia ] is conviction based on a reason so strong that it can never be shaken by any stronger reason.
First of all, as soon as we think that we correctly perceive something, we are spontaneously convinced that it is true. Now if this conviction is so firm that it is impossible for us ever to have any reason for doubting what we are convinced of, then there are no further questions for us to ask: we have everything that we could reasonably want. AT f, CSM These passages and others suggest an account wherein doubt is the contrast of certainty. Descartes adopted the strategy of writing his Meditations as meditations.
Elsewhere Descartes adds, of innate truths: [W]e come to know them by the power of our own native intelligence, without any sensory experience. All geometrical truths are of this sort — not just the most obvious ones, but all the others, however abstruse they may appear. Hence, according to Plato, Socrates asks a slave boy about the elements of geometry and thereby makes the boy able to dig out certain truths from his own mind which he had not previously recognized were there, thus attempting to establish the doctrine of reminiscence.
Our knowledge of God is of this sort. The Methods: Foundationalism and Doubt Of his own methodology, Descartes writes: Throughout my writings I have made it clear that my method imitates that of the architect. When an architect wants to build a house which is stable on ground where there is a sandy topsoil over underlying rock, or clay, or some other firm base, he begins by digging out a set of trenches from which he removes the sand, and anything resting on or mixed in with the sand, so that he can lay his foundations on firm soil.
In the same way, I began by taking everything that was doubtful and throwing it out, like sand … Replies 7, AT f, CSM The theory whereby items of knowledge are best organized on an analogy to architecture traces back to ancient Greek thought — to Aristotle, and to work in geometry. In contrast, metaphysical inquiry might have first principles that conflict with the senses: The difference is that the primary notions which are presupposed for the demonstration of geometrical truths are readily accepted by anyone, since they accord with the use of our senses.
Hence there is no difficulty there, except in the proper deduction of the consequences, which can be done even by the less attentive, provided they remember what has gone before. Admittedly, they are by their nature as evident as, or even more evident than, the primary notions which the geometers study; but they conflict with many preconceived opinions derived from the senses which we have got into the habit of holding from our earliest years, and so only those who really concentrate and meditate and withdraw their minds from corporeal things, so far as possible, will achieve perfect knowledge of them.
Descartes adds: All the mistakes made in the sciences happen, in my view, simply because at the beginning we make judgements too hastily, and accept as our first principles matters which are obscure and of which we do not have a clear and distinct notion. Search , AT , CSM Though foundationalism brilliantly allows for the expansion of knowledge from first principles, Descartes thinks that a complementary method is needed to help us discover genuine first principles.
The passage adds: Reason now leads me to think that I should hold back my assent from opinions which are not completely certain and indubitable just as carefully as I do from those which are patently false. So, for the purpose of rejecting all my opinions, it will be enough if I find in each of them at least some reason for doubt. AT , CSM In the architectural analogy, we can think of bulldozers as the ground clearing tools of demolition.
Writes Gassendi: There is just one point I am not clear about, namely why you did not make a simple and brief statement to the effect that you were regarding your previous knowledge as uncertain so that you could later single out what you found to be true. Why instead did you consider everything as false , which seems more like adopting a new prejudice than relinquishing an old one?
This strategy made it necessary for you to convince yourself by imagining a deceiving God or some evil demon who tricks us , whereas it would surely have been sufficient to cite the darkness of the human mind or the weakness of our nature.
In reply, Descartes remarks: You say that you approve of my project for freeing my mind from preconceived opinions; and indeed no one can pretend that such a project should not be approved of. Is it really so easy to free ourselves from all the errors which we have soaked up since our infancy?
Can we really be too careful in carrying out a project which everyone agrees should be performed? Replies 5, AT , CSM f Evidently, Descartes holds that the universal and hyperbolic character of methodical doubt is helpful to its success. Descartes offers the following analogy: Suppose [a person] had a basket full of apples and, being worried that some of the apples were rotten, wanted to take out the rotten ones to prevent the rot spreading.
How would he proceed? Would he not begin by tipping the whole lot out of the basket? And would not the next step be to cast his eye over each apple in turn, and pick up and put back in the basket only those he saw to be sound, leaving the others?
In just the same way, those who have never philosophized correctly have various opinions in their minds which they have begun to store up since childhood, and which they therefore have reason to believe may in many cases be false.
They then attempt to separate the false beliefs from the others, so as to prevent their contaminating the rest and making the whole lot uncertain. Now the best way they can accomplish this is to reject all their beliefs together in one go, as if they were all uncertain and false. They can then go over each belief in turn and re-adopt only those which they recognize to be true and indubitable. Replies 7, AT , CSM That even one falsehood would be mistakenly treated as a genuine first principle — say, the belief that the senses are reliable , or that ancient authorities should be trusted — threatens to spread falsehood to other beliefs in the system.
Two such objections are suggested in a passage from the pragmatist Peirce: We cannot begin with complete doubt. We must begin with all the prejudices which we actually have when we enter upon the study of philosophy. These prejudices are not to be dispelled by a maxim [viz. Hence this initial skepticism will be a mere self-deception, and not real doubt … A person may, it is true, in the course of his studies, find reason to doubt what he began by believing; but in that case he doubts because he has a positive reason for it, and not on account of the Cartesian maxim.
Let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts. Descartes introduces sceptical arguments precisely in acknowledgement that we need such reasons: I did say that there was some difficulty in expelling from our belief everything we have previously accepted. One reason for this is that before we can decide to doubt, we need some reason for doubting; and that is why in my First Meditation I put forward the principal reasons for doubt. Yet at the moment my eyes are certainly wide awake when I look at this piece of paper; I shake my head and it is not asleep; as I stretch out and feel my hand I do so deliberately, and I know what I am doing.
All this would not happen with such distinctness to someone asleep. As if I did not remember other occasions when I have been tricked by exactly similar thoughts while asleep! AT , CSM As for the range of experiences that we can suppose dreams able to imitate, Descartes looks to hold that every kind of sensory experience is subject to the doubt.
As the meditator puts it: [E]very sensory experience I have ever thought I was having while awake I can also think of myself as sometimes having while asleep; and since I do not believe that what I seem to perceive in sleep comes from things located outside me, I did not see why I should be any more inclined to believe this of what I think I perceive while awake. As Descartes has his meditator say: [T]here may be some other faculty [of my mind] not yet fully known to me, which produces these ideas without any assistance from external things; this is, after all, just how I have always thought ideas are produced in me when I am dreaming.
Yet the Always Dreaming Doubt calls this into question: All these considerations are enough to establish that it is not reliable judgement but merely some blind impulse that has made me believe up till now that there exist things distinct from myself which transmit to me ideas or images of themselves through the sense organs or in some other way.
Whereas: [A]rithmetic, geometry and other subjects of this kind, which deal only with the simplest and most general things, regardless of whether they really exist in nature or not, contain something certain and indubitable. For whether I am awake or asleep, two and three added together are five, and a square has no more than four sides. It seems impossible that such transparent truths should incur any suspicion of being false.
The passage continues: Perhaps there may be some who would prefer to deny the existence of so powerful a God rather than believe that everything else is uncertain. Descartes makes the same point in a parallel passage of the Principles : [W]e have been told that there is an omnipotent God who created us.
Now we do not know whether he may have wished to make us beings of the sort who are always deceived even in those matters which seem to us supremely evident … We may of course suppose that our existence derives not from a supremely powerful God but either from ourselves or from some other source; but in that case, the less powerful we make the author of our coming into being, the more likely it will be that we are so imperfect as to be deceived all the time.
Early in the Second Meditation, Descartes has his meditator observe: I have convinced myself that there is absolutely nothing in the world, no sky, no earth, no minds, no bodies. Does it now follow that I too do not exist? No: if I convinced myself of something then I certainly existed. But there is a deceiver of supreme power and cunning who is deliberately and constantly deceiving me.
In that case I too undoubtedly exist, if he is deceiving me; and let him deceive me as much as he can, he will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think that I am something. So after considering everything very thoroughly, I must finally conclude that this proposition, I am , I exist , is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind.
AT , CSM f As the canonical formulation has it, I think therefore I am Latin: cogito ergo sum ; French: je pense , donc je suis — a formulation does not expressly appear in the Meditations. Indeed, in the passage following the cogito , Descartes has his meditator say: And yet may it not perhaps be the case that these very things which I am supposing to be nothing [e.
I do not know, and for the moment I shall not argue the point, since I can make judgements only about things which are known to me. As Stephen Menn writes: Although the Meditator now knows that he is, he does not seem to know what he is: his old conception of his nature has been called into doubt, and he does not seem to have anything new to replace it.
But I maintain that this awareness [ cognitionem ] of his is not true knowledge [ scientiam ], since no act of awareness [ cognitio ] that can be rendered doubtful seems fit to be called knowledge [ scientia ].
Now since we are supposing that this individual is an atheist, he cannot be certain that he is not being deceived on matters which seem to him to be very evident as I fully explained. Replies 2, AT , CSM This alone does not prove that the cogito is not intended to count as perfect knowledge.
Consider the following texts, each arising in a context of clarifying the requirements of perfect knowledge italics are added : For if I do not know this [i. As Curley writes: Notice that Descartes does not say: until I know whether God exists and can be a deceiver I cannot be certain of anything except the existence of the self and its thoughts. He says he cannot be certain of anything.
The answer: I am certain that I am a thinking thing. Do I not therefore also know what is required for my being certain about anything? In this first item of knowledge [ cognitione ] there is simply a clear and distinct perception of what I am asserting. AT , CSM The next two paragraphs help clarify among other things what Descartes takes to be epistemically impressive about clear and distinct perception, but absent from external sense perception.
Of external sensation, the third paragraph offers this: Yet I previously accepted as wholly certain and evident many things which I afterwards realized were doubtful. What were these? The earth, sky, stars, and everything else that I apprehended with the senses. But what was it about them that I perceived clearly?
Just that the ideas, or thoughts, of such things appeared before my mind. Yet even now I am not denying that these ideas occur within me. AT , CSM f Though we regularly form judgments based on external sensation, they are easily undermined by sceptical doubt, as shown by the Now Dreaming Doubt. The fourth paragraph offers this: But what about when I was considering something very simple and straightforward in arithmetic or geometry, for example that two and three added together make five, and so on?
Did I not see at least these things clearly enough to affirm their truth? AT , CSM Prima facie, this excerpt suggests that multiple propositions are — at this pre-theistic stage of the broader argument — fully indubitable, thereby counting as perfect knowledge. This brings us to the second point noted above, namely, that even cognitions this impressive can be undermined by Evil Genius Doubt — an outcome clarified in the final lines of this same paragraph: For if I do not know this [i.
Seeming to reinforce further the suspicion that the cogito cannot be doubted is a more general thesis Descartes holds concerning the doubt-resistance of any matters that are clearly and distinctly perceived: [T]he nature of my mind is such that I cannot but assent to these things, at least so long as I clearly perceive them.
Consider these italics are added : [Perhaps some God could have given me a nature such that I was deceived even in matters which seemed most evident. Indeed, the only reason for my later judgement that they were open to doubt was that it occurred to me that perhaps some God could have given me a nature such that I was deceived even in matters which seemed most evident.
Yet when I turn to the things themselves which I think I perceive very clearly, I am so convinced by them that I spontaneously declare: let whoever can do so deceive me, he will never bring it about that I am nothing, so long as I continue to think I am something; or make it true at some future time that I have never existed, since it is now true that I exist; or bring it about that two and three added together are more or less than five, or anything of this kind in which I see a manifest contradiction.
Descartes thus closes the pivotal fourth paragraph, clarifying that because of the Evil Genius Doubt, nothing yet meets the epistemic standard of perfect knowledge: And since I have no cause to think that there is a deceiving God, and I do not yet even know for sure whether there is a God at all, any reason for doubt which depends simply on this supposition is a very slight and, so to speak, metaphysical one.
But in order to remove even this slight reason for doubt, as soon as the opportunity arises I must examine whether there is a God, and, if there is, whether he can be a deceiver.
For if I do not know this, it seems that I can never be quite certain about anything else. AT , CSM A later Third Meditation passage — but one occurring prior to the arguments for God — can be taken to suggest a very different interpretation.
There is a big difference here. Whatever is revealed to me by the natural light — for example that from the fact that I am doubting it follows that I exist, and so on — cannot in any way be open to doubt. This is because there cannot be another faculty both as trustworthy as the natural light and also capable of showing me that such things are not true.
But as for my natural impulses, I have often judged in the past that they were pushing me in the wrong direction when it was a question of choosing the good, and I do not see why I should place any greater confidence in them in other matters.
The passage occurs in the second paragraph of the Third Meditation: In this first item of knowledge there is simply a clear and distinct perception of what I am asserting; this would not be enough to make me certain of the truth of the matter if it could ever turn out that something which I perceived with such clarity and distinctness was false.
So I now seem [ videor ] to be able to lay it down as a general rule that whatever I perceive very clearly and distinctly is true. The following Fifth Meditation passage illustrates the point: Admittedly my nature is such that so long as I perceive something very clearly and distinctly I cannot but believe it to be true. But my nature is also such that I cannot fix my mental vision continually on the same thing, so as to keep perceiving it clearly; and often the memory of a previously made judgement may come back, when I am no longer attending to the arguments which led me to make it.
And so other arguments can now occur to me which might easily undermine my opinion, if I were unaware of [the true] God; and I should thus never have true and certain knowledge about anything, but only shifting and changeable opinions.
For example, when I consider the nature of a triangle, it appears most evident to me, steeped as I am in the principles of geometry, that its three angles are equal to two right angles; and so long as I attend to the proof, I cannot but believe this to be true. For I can convince myself that I have a natural disposition to go wrong from time to time in matters which I think I perceive as evidently as can be.
AT f; AT 8a:9f. From these arguments the meditator concludes: I recognize that it would be impossible for me to exist with the kind of nature I have — that is, having within me the idea of God — were it not the case that God really existed. It is clear enough from this that he cannot be a deceiver, since it is manifest by the natural light that all fraud and deception depend on some defect. As the passage reasons: Judgment error occurs. That judgment error occurs is incompatible with the hypothesis that I am the creation of an all-perfect God.
Therefore, I am not the creation of an all-perfect God. And since God does not wish to deceive me, he surely did not give me the kind of faculty which would ever enable me to go wrong while using it correctly.
There would be no further doubt on this issue were it not that what I have just said appears to imply that I am incapable of ever going wrong. For if everything that is in me comes from God, and he did not endow me with a faculty for making mistakes, it appears that I can never go wrong. In short, actual mistakes of judgment arise from user error: [If] I simply refrain from making a judgement in cases where I do not perceive the truth with sufficient clarity and distinctness, then it is clear that I am behaving correctly and avoiding error.
But if in such cases I either affirm or deny, then I am not using my free will correctly. A clever strategy of argument thus unfolds — effectively inverting the usual reasoning in the problem of evil: I am the creation of an all-perfect God. That I am the creation of an all-perfect God is incompatible with the sceptical hypothesis that I am in error about what I clearly and distinctly perceive.
Therefore, I am not in error about what I clearly and distinctly perceive. As Thomas Lennon notes: [I]t would be nothing less than astonishing if the central argument of the central text of the central figure of the central period in the history of philosophy were obviously circular.
How could the father of modern philosophy, the source of the epistemological turn, have produced such an obviously loopy argument? The Third Meditation arguments for God define one arc: Arc 1 : The conclusion that an all-perfect God exists is derived from premises that are clearly and distinctly perceived.
The Fourth Meditation argument defines a second arc: Arc 2 : The general veracity of propositions that are clearly and distinctly perceived i. Vicious Circularity interpretation : Arc 1 : The conclusion that an all-perfect God exists is derived from premises that are clearly and distinctly perceived — i. Bounded Doubt interpretations : Arc 1 : The conclusion that an all-perfect God exists is derived from premises that are clearly and distinctly perceived — indeed, premises belonging to a special class of truths that are fully immune to doubt prior to establishing the general veracity of propositions that are clearly and distinctly perceived.
Unbounded Doubt interpretations : Arc 1 : The conclusion that an all-perfect God exists is derived from premises that are clearly and distinctly perceived — i.
But we may forget the arguments in question and later remember simply the conclusions which were deduced from them. For even if it were granted that his argument is both valid and simple enough to be grasped intuitively, as soon as it is no longer so grasped it would seem to fall open to the very same doubt as it refutes. What is the value of such a momentary triumph over scepticism? In the build-up to the passage claiming that the Evil Genius Doubt is finally and fully overcome, Descartes writes: Some of the things I clearly and distinctly perceive are obvious to everyone, while others are discovered only by those who look more closely and investigate more carefully; but once they have been discovered, the latter are judged to be just as certain as the former.
In the case of a right-angled triangle, for example, the fact that the square on the hypotenuse is equal to the square on the other two sides is not so readily apparent as the fact that the hypotenuse subtends the largest angle; but once one has seen it, one believes it just as strongly.
But as regards God, if I were not overwhelmed by preconceived opinions, and if the images of things perceived by the senses did not besiege my thought on every side, I would certainly acknowledge him sooner and more easily than anything else. For what is more self-evident [ ex se est apertius ] than the fact that the supreme being exists, or that God, to whose essence alone existence belongs, exists?
Although it needed close attention for me to perceive this, I am now just as certain of it as I am of everything else which appears most certain. And what is more, I see that the certainty of all other things depends on this, so that without it nothing can ever be perfectly known. AT , CSM f Descartes reiterates the theme in the Second Replies: I ask my readers to spend a great deal of time and effort on contemplating the nature of the supremely perfect being.
Above all they should reflect on the fact that the ideas of all other natures contain possible existence, whereas the idea of God contains not only possible but wholly necessary existence. This alone, without a formal argument, will make them realize that God exists; and this will eventually be just as self-evident [ per se notum ] to them as the fact that the number two is even or that three is odd, and so on.
For there are certain truths which some people find self-evident, while others come to understand them only by means of a formal argument. And since it is impossible to imagine that he is a deceiver , whatever we clearly and distinctly perceive must be completely accepted as true and certain.
AT , CSM ; italics added The other passage arises in the Fifth Meditation, in the concluding summary explanation of how the sceptical problem is finally overcome. Now, however, I have perceived that God exists, and at the same time I have understood that everything else depends on him, and that he is no deceiver; and I have drawn the conclusion that everything which I clearly and distinctly perceive is of necessity true.
Accordingly, even if I am no longer attending to the arguments which led me to judge that this is true, as long as I remember that I clearly and distinctly perceived it, there are no counter-arguments which can be adduced to make me doubt it, but on the contrary I have true and certain knowledge of it. And I have knowledge not just of this matter, but of all matters which I remember ever having demonstrated, in geometry and so on.
For what objections can now be raised? That the way I am made makes me prone to frequent error? But I now know that I am incapable of error in those cases where my understanding is transparently clear. Or can it be objected that I have in the past regarded as true and certain many things which I afterwards recognized to be false?
But none of these were things which I clearly and distinctly perceived: I was ignorant of this rule for establishing the truth, and believed these things for other reasons which I later discovered to be less reliable.
So what is left to say? AT , CSM f Absent a self-evident apprehension of God, the two passages appear inexplicable, with Descartes seeming to misunderstand the sceptical implications of his own Evil Genius Doubt. To help clarify this further circle, Della Rocca focuses on a twofold question: Why, for Descartes, should we not assent to ideas that are not clear and distinct and why is there no such obligation not to assent to clear and distinct ideas?
The reason Descartes offers seems to be that we should not assent to ideas that are not clear and distinct because they, unlike clear and distinct ideas, are not guaranteed to be true. Hegel , and Martin Heidegger But however influential these thinkers were, their ideas influenced relatively limited numbers of people, largely academics. The ideas of a few of these philosophers, for instance those of Aquinas and Nietzsche, were woven into religious and political ideologies and affected many people beyond the academy, but not without distortion and embellishment.
Descartes was an exception. His most basic philosophical contribution, the drawing of a fundamental metaphysical difference, gave philosophically authoritative formulation and apparent legitimacy to an idea shared by literally billions of people who, for mainly religious reasons, think of themselves as minds or souls temporarily ensconced in often depreciated physical bodies.
The distinction between the mental and the physical is much older than Descartes, but with the exception of Plato, no Western philosopher prior to Descartes drew the distinction as categorically as he did. But while distinct and separate from the body, the active intellect was a communal and essentially impersonal life-force that animated individual bodies.
He saw the mental as exhaustive of our nature, not as precious augmentation of some physical bodies. Just how did Descartes totally divide the mind and the body? To begin with, in his Meditations on First Philosophy available to some in but published in , in Latin and later in French his primary philosophical objective was to establish what can be known as true with absolute certainty and so to offer a method for acquiring indubitable knowledge. The objective of methodological doubt was to discover and isolate intuitively clear thoughts or ideas that once comprehended cannot be doubted because of their evident and unquestionable truth.
Having applied methodological doubt in the first Meditation, Descartes hit upon the most fundamental and undoubtable truth in the second Meditation: the realization that if he thinks, he must exist. This is the mistake referred to in the blurb advertising this talk. In any case, in the second Meditation Descartes finds the indubitable truth he sought and needed to proceed.
The mental we can be sure of; the physical needs to, somehow, be linked to it. D escartes' doubting leaves us with a rather alarming concern: that our experience is not infallible, and that it has no bearing on the existence of an external world. Of course, this state of affairs has prompted a vast literature on whether the skepticism expressed by Descartes is actually anything to worry about, which has in turn spawned commentaries on the limits to what we can know, as well as just how our existences are tied to that of the world around us.
There are a number of deep philosophical issues exposed by Descartes' Meditations on First Philosophy , which is why it's perceived to mark the beginning of modern philosophy in the Western tradition. Combine that with its highly accessible, dramatized style, and it's no wonder that this short text is still pored over by undergraduate students to this day. It's essential reading for anyone interested in philosophy.
Beyond reading Descartes' Meditations on First Philosophy in full, to further explore the theme of what constitutes the ultimate nature of reality, touched on by Descartes' pondering, check out our five-day introductory philosophy course, Life's Big Questions.
On day two of Life's Big Questions , we hone in on the question of whether or not the world around us is real , discussing Descartes further, and also considering responses from the philosophical giants who followed and had a lot to say about Descartes' skepticism about the external world! Interested in learning more? Explore the full course now! Why does anything exist? Do we have free will? How should we approach life? Start learning today.
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